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In the following paper the eo..iaaion presents ita repl7 to the Beads 
of State or Govel'DIIent  who,  at the European Co\lllcil aeeting held on 
28  and 29  June,  asked it to take stock of the problema  oormeoted with 
enlargement  and to make  appropriate proposals. 
In doing this, the Commission  has based i taelf on: 
(i) the points aade by the Heads  of State or Government  in reply to 
the letter sent to them  by the President of the Commission; 
(ii) infomation acquired since the start of the negotiations; 
(iii) updated data or special studies carried out by it for this purpose. 
The  Coauaission has B\llllllarized ita anal;raia of the problema  and the 
guidelines it suggests in a  short tert in order to present to the Beads 
of State or Government  only the aain linea of ita thinking and proposals. 
In the annex to this paper it presents more  specific details INIIIl&rizing 
the particular and technical data regarding the probl_. it is dealing 
with. 
The  Commission  1 a  approach has  been based on  the  p~noiple that the 
Community's  political objective is to achieve enlargement within a 
reasonable period of time.  In this oormeotion it noted that the aambera 
of the European Council unaniaoual7 reiterated their political will to 
achieve that goal. 
The  a.ia of the proposals aade by the Commission is to offer linea of 
conduct  and negotiation enabling the obstacles which  hsve hitherto  del~ed 
completion of the prooeaa of enlargaaent to be overoo.e on both aides. -2-
I.  Pre]jminaq considerations 
Two  points IDUBt  be made  regarding (i) the present  ata&e  reached in the 
accession negotiations with Portugal  8Zld  Spain 8Zld  (ii) the context in 
which those negotiations should be seen. 
So  far progress has been mads  in the accession negotiations,  which 
have been conducted with each of the applican-t countries on the basis 
of its Oll!l merits,  on a  large m.ber of chapters,  IICIIBe  of which mq be 
regarded as having been settled peuding 8D overall agreement. 
Purther progress must  still to be  made  with Spain,  however,  in crucial oha ters 
of the negotiations,  such as the oustoaa union for industrial products, 
external relations and the ECSC,  and  substantive negotiations have ;yet  to 
started with the two applicants on the social affairs, 
fisheries and agriculture chapters.  It  has not yet been possible to 
assess  Spain's and PortUB&l' a  concern regarding their 
budgetary situation during the post-accession transitional period; 
concrete negotiating results have  IIDt  in fact been achieved on 
such essential aspects of the matter as the alignment of agrioul  tural 
prices and aids.  Finally  1  the questions raised by the participation of 
Portugal  and Spain in the Community  institutions must also be settled. 
The  negotiations have not mcovered any problems which had not 
previously been identified.  '!be  Commission's analysis of enlargement  in 
both its ''General considerations"  and its "Opinions"  and  subsequent 
proposals is therefore,  in the main,  still relevant. 
In the evaluation of the oondi  tiona  and oonsequences of enlargement  1 
however,  two points - the importance of which has increased over the past 
few years - JDUBt  be cphaaized. 
..  ·••+-··.----3-
First of all, the economic environment of enlargement has seriously 
deteriorated.  The  Commission clearly stated, particularly in its 
"General Considerations" that "a return to sufficiently rapid and 
lasting growth is a  major oondition for resolving the serious economic 
policy problems which have  to be overcome"  and thus on it depends  "the 
reciprocal capacity  of the applicants and the Oommunitl  to overcome 
the obstacles arising from  restructuring and intensified caapetition"1• 
It has to be said that the continuing recession has  prevented such  an 
objective from being attained.  The  apparently realiatio assumption of 
growth of the order of 3-4%  has not materialized,  making the problem of 
employment  more  acute,  in both the Community,  and Portugal and Spain, 
and making it even more  difficult to deal with the problema of 
restructuring, particularly in those sectors where  there is considerable 
spare production capacity and major oompetition problems  at international 
level. 
For the future,  the prospect of an imminent  and durable return to 
growth rates of the order of those previously envisaged.  remains unlikely. 
The  second point  to be  taken into account  concerns the internal 
develo}lllent of the present Community.  Fundamental problems,  accentuated 
by the impact  of the recession,  currently exist even outside the 
context of  enlarp~~ent,  the prospect of which makes  those problems appear 
even more  acute,  however.  ~e problems include the paiDtul. restructuring 
whioh the Oo-=1  ty bas 1Uidertaken ill  a  l11111ber  of sectors in crisis. 
Oqord.inaUon at Oo...U.  ty level and,  ln particular,  the introduction 
of joint disciplines have provided a  framework for the adjustment process. 
Another problem concerns the new fields and resources the Community will  . 
have available to it in the future for its develo~t.  In  this 
\ 
connection  it  JDUBt  be  stressed  that the  Oo.auni  'y is toda.Y  very close to the 
1%  VAT  ceiling.  Lastly,  there are the difficulties, ~w  felt more  acutely 
than ever,  regarding  the institutions'  decision-male~  procedures. 
1Economic and sectoral aspects of enlargement,  OOM(7a?200  final,  para.  104. 
\ -4-
II.  General orieiRaUou 
At  the present stage of the negotiations the Commission feels that 
the following three general OI'S.e:dati~ ..n ~  OOJiftJWd  80 tlaat  the 
framework within which enlarge•ent is to take place ia aa11Ul'8Cis 
(i) clarity of the teras of aooesaion; 
(ii) adoption of the acguie  COIIIIIUil&Utaire  in full; 
(iii) simultaneous accession of Portugal and Spain. 
Clarity. of the terms of accession is an obj eoti  ve  which must  be oonfirmed 
by the Community.  The  negotiations must  le.ad  to transparency of the 
terms for both Portugal 'a and Spain's accession,  particularly with regard 
to the nature and  content of the transitional period.  '!hie search for 
olari  ty prior to accession is one  of the reaaona for the European 
Council's request for a  stocktaking exercise,  and it is a  point  on  which 
the  Heads  of State or Government  have stressed their conoem. 
Aa  the Commission  has already stated in the "J'resco",  this does not 
prevent the implementation of new  policies involving,  in certain cases, 
a  differentiated application of Community  measures and instruments in 
the applicant countries.  Increased use of such flexibility might prove 
neoessar.y throughout  the transitional period. 
In general,  the Commdssion notes that possibilities for differentiation 
compatible with the Treaties already exist.  Differentiation in the 
implementing measures can indeed make  for  sound  management  of the  common 
policies. 
In the "Fresoo" the Commission  also envisaged a  transition in stages, 
respecting the principle of adoption of the aogpis in full by the applic 
countries.  It foresaw a  certain flexibility in the management  of the 
transitional period,  the total length of whioh  would be fixed in +.he 
Treaty of Accession.  This solution waa  not adopted  in the 
agreements  already reached in the context of the negotiations. 
It would  now  create problems  as regazods  the balance to be established 
between the various chapters of the  negotiations or within those ohapter  • 
In view of the diffioul  t  budgetar.y and trade problems  facing the  Communi t 
and  the applicant countries,  the idea of considering adoption of only p 
of the acguis coemunautaire might  seem  an attractive solution.  In practi 
this option could,  without settling the baeio problem,  the solution of 
... ,  ......  ·-----5-
which  would  merely be deferred,  give rise to even  greater new 
difficulties.  If such  an  e:xoeption were  to be made  for either party 
this wuld obviously not be done  without  a  trade-off.  Gradually a 
process would be set in motion which1  going beyond  the principle that 
the problems  of integration can be  resolved progressively by introducing 
transitional measures,  would  considerably dilute the aoguis as a  whole. 
To  this wuld be  added the problem  of the insti  tutiona'  decision-making 
capacity with  regard to policies which would  no  longer be  oommon. 
Simqltaveous accession for Portugal and Spain would  appear preferable,  for 
both the CoiDDIUnity  and the applicant countries.  Even if the acu10e:ness  of 
the  problems  and  the progress made  in the negotiations differ, this goal 
can be  achieved. 
The  obstacles to the  accession of both applicants can in fact be  overcome 
within a  reasonable period of time  am the nature of the  problems  is,  in 
any case,  such as to require a  common  approach.  Moreover,  to delay accession 
would  merely mean  deferring a  solution to the problems and  hence  making them 
even more  intractable. 
The  Commission has already presented,  in the  context of the accession 
negotiations,  proposals for dealing with the  problems;  such proposals,  in 
accordance  with the undertaking given by the Member  States,  DIUst  be  adopted 
as soon as possible. 
The  additional  proposals it is making in this report  should make  it 
possible to overcome  the specific difficulties which  are not being or 
cannot be dealt with in the traditional framework  of negotiations. -6-
III.  Obstacles to enlargement - Proposals for overooming them 
The  obstacles to enlargement  stem not  only from  the specific difficulties 
i:rwolved in integrating Portugal and Spain into the existing Community 
but also  from  the issues mentioned ~  the Commission in the preliminary 
remarks above,  notably the diffioul  ties connected with the functioning 
of the  Community. 
The  Commission's views on these two  aspects are set out below. 
A.  Internal obstacles 
For a  number of years the Community  has been living with a  budget under 
which expenditure is dangerously near the own  resources ceiling, despite 
more  effective management  of the common  agricultural policy and the 
"favourable" trend of prices for agricultural products on  the world market 
The  strengthening of existing common  policies and the development  of new 
ones are essential for the  cohesion of the  Community.  Even though many 
measures  m~  not be reflected in the budget, it is impracticable to consid r 
limiting,  for financial reasons1,  those which might prove necessary. 
The  cost of enlargement to include Portugal and  Spain will not  place  on th 
ColliiiiUtlity  an intolerable financial burden and  cannot  be  regarded as dispro ortiona'te 
to the political  importance  of enlargement.  The  size of the budget,  in its 
:form,  will increase by between 1% and 2<Jt,;  the  two  new  members  will rece ·  net 
trans:ferR which,  on the basis of a  notional budget  (Community  of. Twelve)  or 1981, 
would  have  amounted  to 850 - 1  400 million ECU,  equivalent to between 4'%  nd  &fa 
of the budget  of the enlarged Community. 
1m its reply to the mandate,  the  Commission stated (section 5)  that it 
considered that  COJBJDunity  activity cannot be developed if the  Community 
budget is artificially limited by the present upper limit to its resource  • 
It will take the necessary steps to overcome that constraint. 
.  ......... ._--7-
This burden,  though  limited,  is nevertheless a  real one  and would  result in the 
resources within the  1%  VAT  ceiling being used up.  On  the basis of the  notioD&l 
budget  (Community.of Twelve)  for 1981,  the  VAT  rate would  have  reached 
a  level varying,  according to the hypotheses used,  between 0.964%  and  1.044%. 
Quite apart from  enlargement,  the maintenance  of the  present limits on  own 
resources does not  appear to be  a  practical possibility.  Refusal to increase 
them  would,  for the  operation of a  10  or 12-member Community,  involve in 
practice a  fundamental  revision of present Community  policies.  For the 
CAP  in particular the basic principles followed up to now  would  be  called 
into question,  not  only for products of concern mainly to the  new  member 
countries but also for products of interest to the whole  Community  of Ten. 
It would  also be  necessary to abandon the  ambition of implementing the 
new  policies which the Community  needs to strengthen its capacity,  notably 
in the  industrial and technological  fields and to combat  the aggravation 
of regional disparities.  Thus  the cost necessarily entailed in extending 
the acquis communautaire  to the  new  Member  States is not the  only factor 
to be  taken into account. 
The  Commission considers,  therefore,  that the Community  must  declare its 
readiness to increase  own  resources,  a  need which is already evident, 
even without enlargement.  It will be  putting forward  proposals as speedily 
as possible on  the basis of the consideration it is currently giving to 
this question. 
The  Commission has more  than once  stressed the difficulties which are already 
being caused by the  deadlock in the decision-making process.  Enlargement 
to a  Community  of Twelve  will intensify this problem unless steps are 
taken to make  the  decision-making machinery more  flexible. 
1see Annex- Budgetary matters. --,- ••  ,  ..  I  ....  ,.,.,  ...  ~  ' 
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The  Commission has already indicated in the General Considerations the 
means  by which  decision-making could be  made  more  flexible: 
(i)  greater use  by the Council of the  scope available to it under Articl 
155  of the EEC  Treaty for devolving executive powers  in the Commissi  n; 
(ii)  a  more  systematic use  of the vote  by qualified mjority, as provided 
for in the Treaties; 
(iii) extension of majority voting in certain cases where  the Treaties at 
1
1 
present require unanimity (for example,  in areas covered by Article  00). 
The  separation made  by the Treaty authors between qualified-majority 
' 
mtters and unanimity matters is not  logical in all cases.  Furtherm' re, 
the  changes that have  taken place  in certain sectors of Community 
activity justify the unanimity requirement being replaced now  by one 
of a  qualified majority. 
Any  adjustment  of the institutional aspects of the Treaties must  t 
into account  that major event,  the direct election of Parliament. 
has made  it only natural that the European Parliament's 
be  assigned a  specific role in the attempt to introduce flexibility 
in decision-making,  without  the present balance between the 
institutions being upset. 
I 
The  Commission therefore proposes that the Council  should adopt  a  te~ 
s 
by qualified majority if it is in accordance with the proposal  from  he 
Commission and the  opinion of Parliament. 
The  Commission  considers that the  solutions outlined above  should be  re  ed 
as adjustments to the Treaty,  which  enlargement too has made  necessary and 
which could also be  brought  about  through the procedure  provided for in 
Article 237  of the EEC  Treaty. 
As  regards itself, the Commission will initiate a  process of reflection 
paying particular attention to its make-up  and  the conditions under which 
it operates,  including the use of languages. 
B.  Obstacles thrown up py  the negotiations 
Many of the difficulties involved in enlargement  are  those  which are 
"traditional" in such  a  process.  They arise from the fears engendered 
the Member  States by the prospect of change  in an established situation, 
the  increased openness of their markets to external competitors and  the 
concomitant adjustments in terms of specialization.  However,  the difficu  iss 
tend to obscure  the  structural advantages of economic  integration (increa  d 
size of markets,  improved conditions of competition,  and  so on). 
.....  •·I  I -9-
The  establishment of appropriate transitional measures assuages the 
fears by ensuring gradualness in the  insertion of the economies 
concerned.  In the accession negotiations,  most  of the difficulties 
have  already been resolved - or will be  - by this procedure,  which 
has itself now  become  traditional. 
However,  the Community  is also going to be  faced with intensified 
sectoral difficulties, arising in certain oases from the similarity 
between the  Community's  own  problems and specialization trends in 
the applicant  countries.  The  difficulties relate mainly to Mediterranean 
agricultural products,  fisheries,  textiles and  iron and  steel1•  This 
list does not  include free  movement  of workers from  the applicant 
countries within the  enlarged Community.  A transitional solution to 
this question may  be  found  in the negotiations, as at the  time  of the 
last enlargement. 
The  sectoral difficulties have  two  main characteristic features: 
(a)  they may  relate to  surpluses - whether existing or potential  in 
production capacity,  the  important  point  being that the  phenomenon 
is not  a  passing one: 
the  consumption of certain products cannot  be  increased beyond 
certain limits in present  circumstances; 
changes in structure in international trade and  industrial 
adjustments are forcing a  new  distribution of labour worldwide; 
the Community  has entered into international undertakings granting 
certain facilities,  under various headings,  to non-member  countries; 
for both economic  and political reasons,  there  can be  no  question 
of withdrawing such facilities without inviting countermeasures. 
(b)  the difficulties mainly affect the Community's  less-favoured regions 
(the Mediterranean regions)  or those in the  throes of crisis 
(regions processing declining industries and,  in the  case  of fisheries, 
the  coastal regions). 
1see Annex  for specific developments. -10-
The  Community  is already making a  comprehensive effort to  reduce surplus 
production capacity.  Enlargement  of the Community  must  not  jeopardize 
its efforts or the results achieved. 
Particular stress must be laid on this aspect with regard to agriculture, 
given the significant increase in the Community's  self-sufficiency rates 
which  enlargement will entail in the olive oil, fruit and vegetables 
and  wine  sectors.  In addition,  there is a  potential for still greater 
developaent of these lines of production linked to an  increase in 
productivity and  an extension of irrigated areas. 
The  above  remarks ~  also apply to other fields,  e.g. the industrial sect r. 
The  Commission  considers that cooperation between the Community  and the 
applicant countries must  be  stepped up  as  soon as possible,  especially 
as it is not  in the interests of the enlarged Community  that the applicant 
countries should specialize still further in sensitive sectors. 
The  Commission  considers,  therefore,  that in some  of the fields with the 
characteristics described above  the applicant  countries should agree to 
apply before accession disciplines similar or even  identical to those 
being implemented  in the Community. 
Consequently,  it proposes that discussions be  initiated with the 
applicant  countries,  parallel to the negotiations and geared to their 
specific circumstances,  with a  view to concluding as  rapidly as possible 
a  pre-accession undertaking. 
., .  ·~--~  • I  I 
For the aPPlicant  countries the undertaking would mean  applyi  g 
forms  of discipline in jointly defined areas aimed at meeting  he 
objectives of cohesion within the enlarged Community. 
.  ..............  ···-~--II-
The  Community,  for its part,  would  set a  target date for bringing 
the accession negotiations with Spain and Portugal to a  successful 
conclusion. 
Greater financial and  budgetary assistance would  be  provided, 
firstly, to help the applicant countries fulfil their undertakings 
and,  secondly,  to speed up  the prooess of adjusting and diversifying 
their economies. 
The  applicar~ countries would  also be  informed and  consulted on future 
options wherever a  12-member  viewpoint was  already necessary. 
At  the  same  time,  the Community  should concentrate its internal efforts 
in four key directions in order to prepare itself economically for enlargement 
and  to ensure  that enlargement will be  a  success by removing certain real 
obstacles to the  negotiations'  favourable  outcome: 
(a) aid to less-favoured or crisis-hit regions must  be  stepped up., 
The  Commission would  refer in this connection to its recent  proposals 
to amend  the European Regional Development  Fund  Regulation and 
concerning the  non-quota section of the Fund; 
(b)  on the basis of proposals which the Commission will shortly be  sending 
to the Council,  the Community  must  establish integrated programmes 
for the Mediterranean region; 
(c)  in agriculture,  the Commission has put  proposals before the Member  States 
aimed  at  improving the  operation of the  common  agricultural policy in 
the fruit and vegetable and olive oil sectors.  The  Commission  reaffirms 
its proposals and urges the  need  for  them to be  adopted rapidly. 
The  Commission also stresses the fact that economic  rationalization entails 
fair conditions of competition being respected throughout  the Commun1ty.1 
(d)  With  regard to fisheries,  the  Community  should  round  out  the acquis 
communautaire  as soon as possible,  so that it will have  a  olear basis 
for negotiating the accession of the two  applicant countries in this 
sector. 
With  regard to the Mediterranean non-member  countries with whioh  the Community 
maintains preferential relations and which will be  particularly affected by 
enlargement,  the Commission has already presented an initial communication 
setting out  the main  components  of a  Community Mediterranean policy.  rt will 
amplify its proposals in a  further communication. 
1  See  Annex,  paragraphs  20  and  27. - 12-
Conclusiollll 
.U the Beads of State or GovernMnt ban clearl7 confirMd the 
political pgrpose of enlarp•nt  t  the Co-.sllion OOJllliders  that 
a  concerted effort 1a1st  now  be .U.e to fiJid the 1118&D8  of achieviug 
enlarpMnt. 
It has set ow.t  above its IID&J..yses  am  pnposals.  It awaits from 
the Beads of State or OovernMnt a  clear reapoJllle  on the principal 
choices which, in its view,  are the ke7 to the conclusion of the 
negotiations am  the satiafaotoey hnctioniug of the f'ub.re 
Colllllllli t7 of '!'vel  ve. 
"' ,,. ...  ~  •·  I .  ~  .. .............. ,_ ANALYSIS  BY  SECTOR 
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I •  AGRICULTURE 
1.  The  accession of Spain will  increase the utilized agricultural area of 
the present Community  by  30%t  the agricultural labour force by  25%  and the 
number  of holdings by 32%t  while the addition of 37  million Spanish  consumers 
will increase the number  of consumers  in the Community  by  14%.  For comparisont 
the accession of Portugal will enlarge the  utilized agricultural area by  on~ 
4%t  the agricultural  labour force by  12.8% and the number  of consumers by  3.6%. 
The  contribution of agriculture to gross domestic product  is  9%  in Spain and 
14.5% in Portugalt  compared with 3.9%  in the present Community. 
2.  In terms of outputt  Spanish membership  will put  up  production of 
vegetables by  25%t  of fresh fruit by 48%  and of olive oil by 59%;  production 
of whole  milk will  go  up  by on~ 6%  and  that of cereals by  14.5%.  The 
Community  cattle herd will be  enlarged by only 6%.  The  percentage  increases 
consequent  upon  the accession of Portugal are  e~treme~ low. 
3.  The  above  figures  show  that the  impact  on the  self-sufficiency rate of 
the Community  varies  considerab~ from  product to product. 
Simply by adding the production figurest  the rate of self-sufficiency of the 
Community  in Mediterranean products  (wine,  fruit and vegetables,  olive oil) 
will  go  up,  but  in the  case of a  number  of livestock and  crop products it 
will go  down. 
As  far as the  latter are concerned,  the fact that the two  applicant  countries 
will open their markets and adopt  the principle of Community  preference 
should have  a  favourable effect on  the regions  growing these products in the 
present  Community. 
In the case  of Mediterranean products,  the Community's  self-sufficiency 
rate will reach  100%  or more  but without  causing particularly heavy surpluses, 
with one  or two  exceptions.  However,  the  mere  addition of present production 
figures neglects the  impact  of the  common  agricultural policy on  producers 
in the applicant  countries  in terms of both productivity and  increases in 
the area under cultivation. -2-
4•  The  Community  therefore faces two  basic issues: 
controlling production capacity in the sectors where  surpluses are 
likely to be created or increaBBd; 
rechannelling production towards sectors where  the Community deficit 
with outside countries is likely to widen. 
5•  The  problem of production capacity mainly arises in connection with 
Spain,  one of the major factors being the extension of irrigation. 
Forecasts in this area tend to offer a  wide  ra.nge  of results;  however,  it 
is reasonable to assume  that by 1990  the enlarged Community  will have at 
least 1.2 million hectares of new,  irrigated land under cultivation,  one 
third of this in Spain and two thirds in the  Community  of Ten. 
6.  This said,  the real issue is less the existence of this irrigated 
land than the uses to which  the.  land is put.  The  seriousness of the 
problem is indicated by the fact that the sectors most  concerned (mainly 
vegetables, followed by fruit)  seem to be those where  the equilibrium 
between supply and demand,  taking imports into account,  is becoming 
increasingly unstable. 
The  Commission has taken account  of these difficulties in its proposals 
on the "acguia communautaire".  Any dilution of the proposals as they now 
stand and any further  del~ in adopting them will have  serious implication 
both in the present Community  and in the Community  after enlargement. 
The  solution which  should be aimed at is, unquestionably,  one  in which 
producers farming irrigated land would be encouraged to grow fodder  and -3-
protein crops.  This,  of course,  raises the  problem of their living 
standards. 
1·  There  is no  single,  comprehensive  solution to the problem of 
controlling agricultural  surpluses.  Economio,  social and regional 
constraints need  to be  taken into consideration and these  in turn are 
intimately linked to the problem of rechannelling production. 
A.  Olive oil 
8.  With  the accession of Greece,  the Community's 
deficit in olive oil has diminished sharply as the level of self-
sufficiency has risen from  an  average  of  between  86%  and  96%  in  the  Community  of 
the  Nine  to  95%  in  the  Community  of  the  Ten.Production  is  shared  by  three Member 
States  with  Italy producing  70%,  Greece  producing  29.6%  and  France  producing  0.4%. 
9•  The  annual production of olive oil in Spain is on  average 
463.000 t, i.e. almost  60%  of the production of the Community  of the 
Ten.  The  level of self-sufficiency in Spain is close to  13~.  The 
accession of Spain alone will have  the effect,  if consumption remains  the 
same,  of  increasing the  level of self-sufficiency in the Community  of the 
Eleven to about  109%,  a  figure that will not  be  altered greatly by  the 
accession of Portugal.  The  latter produces  a  volume  correspond~ to only 
about  &fa  the  10-member EEC' s  production and,  according to the  information 
available,  supply and demand  there are  more  or less in balance. 
It should be  added that in both Portugal and Spain special arrangements 
have  been  introduced guaranteeing outlets for nationally-produced olive 
oil.  The  adoption of the "aoquis oommunautaire" will entail the 
abolition of these arrangements and  consequeJ;tly favour the consumption 
of less expensive  competing vegetable oils imported into the Community 
at a  zero rate of duty or at relatively low  rates and without quantitative 
restrictions. -4-
10.  On  the basis of the existing Community  legislation this situation 
would  have  three consequences: 
- a  surplus estimated at 230  000 t, i.e. a  level of self-sufficiency 
of 122%,  would  emerge  in the Community  of the Twelve,  not  as a 
I 
result of  increased production but  the replacement  by  the  consumer  ot 
oil by oompa'Cing1  and cheaper,  substitutes: 
otive 
in view of the provisions governing the  common  organization of the 
market  in olive oil relating to production and marketing aids,  there 
would be an increase in bud89t  costs linked with the rise in 
production of around 800  million EOU,  costing in all 1  645  million ECU 
in the Community  of the Twelve  compared with 845  millionECU in the 
Community  of the Ten; 
- the Community  olive oil market  might  be lost to the main exporting 
non-member  countries for whom  such access is of crucial  importance. 
I 
Those  countries are Tunisia  (52.000t  =  0  75-80), Morocco  C11.000t  =  0  7~-80) 
and Turkey. 
11.  A comprehensive  and compulsory  reduction in production capacity does 1 
appear :feaaible  for a  number of reasons.  For one  thing,  the regions 
concerned are among  the poorest  in the Community.  But  in addition to thi 
economic  consideration,  ecological and social factors prevent recourse to 
alternatives to olive-growing,  an activity which will contribute to the 
incomes  of nearly three million farmers  in the twelve-country Community. 
A reduction in production capacity would  also be extremely costly without 
providing any  guarantee that  the number  of holdings would  in fact be 
appreciably diminished.  The  Commission  has,  however,  stated that,  when 
this is practicable,  it will provide  incentives for conversion. 
It should be noted in this connection that under the plan adopted in 
October  1981  Spain has already undertaken to reduce considerably the area 
under olive-trees. 
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12.  The  Commission  has therefore proposed measures\ confirmed in Part I 
of this document,  on  the  level of demand  for olive oil together with a 
long transitional period for Spain and Portugal and arrangements with 
non-member  countries which  supply other vegetable oils, postponing until 
a  later date  the question of  introducing a  non-discriminatory consumption 
tax on  vegetable oils. 
13.  For the non-member  countries which  now  provide part of the Community's 
supplementary olive oil supplies  (15%  of the production of the Community 
of the Ten)  the opportunities for redirecting their exports to other markets 
are very  limited,  especially in the case of Tunisia,  which  sends 78%  of its 
olive oil exports,  i.e. almost  5o%  of its agricultural exports,  to the 
Community. 
The  problem is a  particularly sensitive one,  therefore, which  the Community 
will have  to resolve when  implementing its new  overall policy for the 
Mediterranean.  It should be borne  in mind  in this connection that the 
Heads  of State or  of Government  have  made  it clear that enlargement  should 
not  weaken  the existing links between  the Community  and its Mediterranean 
partners. 
B.  Fruit and vegetables 
14•  Most  of the production of fresh fruit and  vegetables in the present 
Community  is concentrated in three Member  States/regions.  These  are 
Italy,  the Mediterranean areas of Franoe,  and  Greece,  the latter still in 
a  transitional period after accession and already exerting competitive 
pressure  on the first two  countries mentioned.  In terms of products subject 
to price fixing and  intervention,  the three countries/regions account 
respectively for 4o%,  21.6% and  9•9%  of fresh fruit production and 40.1%, 
24.4% and  6.3% of fresh vegetable production. 
Production of citrus fruit  is concentrated in Italy,  which  accounted for 
99%  before the accession of Greece,  the remainder being met  by France. 
1coM(80)55  of 23  l&rch  1980  &Di oo•(B1)610  final of f5  October 1981. -6-
15.  At  preaeat, tr.te between Spain ud PortliPl ud tho Co..mt;r 1a 
pveraed b;r the pro'riaieu relaUuc to aon-Co-.1  t;r coUDtries u  part 
ot the co-n orpuizaUon ot tho .arkot in tnit ud veptablos. 
'fho  1970  trade agreo•nt be'twHD  the Co-m,  t;r ud SpaiD II"&Dted the 
latter a  Jllla'ber  ot t&ritt reuoUou averactnc  &l'01lDI1  ~~  tho 
products ooaceraed. are those ot •Jor illpor\aaoo to the  Spanish ocODOIQ'• 
Silli.larl;r, Portupl beMtits tr.a taritt ooaoessiou tor a  maabor ot 
agrioul:w.ral upon products 'IUIIler  the 1972  tr.te agreo•nt.  'fhe 
protocol added in 1976  and  the  complementary  protocol  of  1979  •ade  furthe 
reductions  in  the  concessions  already existing. 
Protection ot the Co..ni  t;r market in the cue et a  Dllllber ot seui  U ve 
tnt  t  ud veptable products is provided b;r D&tior.tal  iJIPOM 
restricUou allwed UJJder  the .lleplation establiahing the co_,n 
orguizaUon ot the -.rket in trui  t  ad veptablos. 
16.  '!'he  aoceasion ot Portqal. will DOt  have a  substantial iapact on 
the Coa.DDit;r's selt-sutticioDO;r rates in citrus tnit &ad  other troah 
trait ad veptables because ct tho saall size ot Portugal's 
production relative to that ot the present Coa.DDity  and  the tact that 
it oDl;r haa exportable INl'J)luaoa  in tomatoes,  almonds  and  onions. 
Since, however,  Portuguese prioes are lover than those in tho Oo-m  t;r 
it is likeq that producUoa there will toDd.  to iaoreuo, thO\l&h  tho 
ettect will probabq be  IIOdest in ooaparison vi  th the total value ot 
Co-m.  t;r output. 
17.  '!'he  accession ot Spaia will u:n quite 41ttorent reporcussiou on 
tho Co...ait;r's rate ot selt-eutticieJ1C7•  Spanish production is 
hea'riq in surplus ia citna truit  (23~) ud. to a  lesser extem in 
other truU aDd.  veptables (percema,ps between  120%  and  100%1). 
Spain haa 2.8 aillioa hectares ot lam uDder irrigation so that Spuiah 
accession will iacreaae the irrigated uoa  in the Jllld.iterranean re&iona 
ot the Co-m  t;r b;r 80%. 
1Peaohea  105~, apricots 108%,  to•to  .. 110%1  pears 101%1  potatoes 102%, 
grapes  10)%,  cherries 100%,  apples  103%,  croon be&DII  1~, peu 107%, 
omou 120%  ( 75-77). 
.. ...........  ' -7-
18.  Without tUiq aecouat of the effect which beiq in the Co-m.  ty 
will have on Spain, the Co..anity's self-euftioienoy rate tor citrus 
fruit will inoreue oouiclerably after enlarp...t, to 89%.  !lUll 
aelf-autfioienoy will be  &1110st  reached or exceeded iD the oue of all 
other free trui  t  and veptables  1•  <Jenerally speald.JICt  110re  1;han ~ 
on average of Spain's free fruit al1d  veptable exports go  to the 
Co.wU.t;r. 
Spain also haa  definite potential to expud i te output b7  iJIPl'9viDC 
;yields  &1111  increuing irrigaUol'le  The  rise iD price levels  &1111  the 
introduction of support s;rste ..  ,  which do  net currently u:iat tor 
f'rui  t  and vept&bles,  could han the effect of .,bililiq this 
production potential. 
It should &lao  be pointed out that the produota which will coae llDiier 
the  greatea~ OOIIPeU U ve  pressure beoauae of enlarp•at are &lao  theae 
maiD17  8J'OWD  in the leaat-favoured areaa of the present Co-m.ty. 
19.  The Co-m.v will have  te tr;r to achieve wo objeoUvesa 
- to eDSUre  over the Mdiu tera taat llllpply  and de..al are 110re  or leas 
in balance  &1111  'tllat preduoUon is aprelld.  enDly over the arkeUng 
;rear eo that the interplq of -.rket foro .. providea prodaoera with a 
fair iaoo•J 
- to introduce  SUi table aeaaures to help the regiona affected in 
adapting to the  new  co.,atitive aitu&tion. 
20.  In this ooi!McUon, it atat be streaaed that a  poliq of arket 
equilibriu at a U• of ver;r 8lucg111h de..ai, wi tA the  .ainte~UU~oe of 
i11p0rta froa :no-aber Jlllliiterrauan countries, will prove 
iiiPraeUoable ualeaa  &D  aUeJII)t ia &Ide  to iDfluenoe not  only the  type  of 
produ.ota  grown on new  1&1111  won  'thro1lCh  irrip.Uon  but also the condi  tiona 
of competition between Community  producers that go  against the rational 
siting of crops. 
1 
Peaches  105%,  apricots 102%,  toll&toes  99%,  pears  101%1  potat"s 1<>0%, 
grapes  1oo%,  cherries 99%,  applea 99%,  greea beau 99%,  peaa  100%, 
onions 98%• 
-1-IJ ... -8-
c.  Wine  -
21.  In tho wine sector the accession of Spain &Ill Portqal iS to be 
viewed in the contort of problo• which relate not onl.7 to tho level 
of 1111pp]J  ba.t  &lao  to the ooDdi tiou iD which do-.! oan express 
itself. 
22  •  Portugal produces an averaee of 11  ld.llion hoctoli  tres of wine  a 
year.  Production is in surplus (the degree of self-sufficiency is 
122%),  but will account for onl.7  5%  of total production in a  Co-m.ty 
of 'fwelve. 
23.  In Spain the area UDder  viBes is about 1.  7 a:Ulion hectares, 95% 
of which is used for the prGCluction of wine grapes.  In recent TO&rS 
Spanish wine production has avera,ed 36  ld.llion heotolitros against 
158  million hoctolitros in the Co.aanity of Tell,  i.e. 24%  of Co.-unity 
prodllction.  '!'his is equal to 50'%  of Italian production aDd  55%  of 
French production,  &1 though in both those cO\Ultries the area planted 
is .mob less than in Spain. 
Generally speaking, the CoiiiiiiUd ty of Tvolve should be  just about 
self-sufficient.  '!'hero is a  riek, however,  that the  CoiiiiiiiUli ty's 
sv.rplllB of white wine will increase.  Spain has a  straotural eurplus 
of white wine which hitherto has been dealt with .ainly by the 
practice of lllixing red aDd  whi to wines. 
24•  In the  CoiiiiWiity,  control of wine production is baaed on 
-a  planting policy which regulates  DeW  plantings and gives prioriT,y 
to improving quality over illcreasing yields aDd  enriching poor 
vintages; 
- a  market policy. 
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25.  Preventive distillation measures were  a4opted as part ot the 
*"'  1982  "Price packap".  '!'hey  should help to iiiJirove  the bal&DOe 
on the table wine  market in the tu.tare.  Ba.t  the f'uDrl&Mntal  problea 
oonsieb in applying the  regu.l.atiane already lldopted in an enlarpd 
CoiiBUli ty, by MU18 ot proper Co.-ni  ty oantrol with efteoti  ve 
Co..anity sanctions. 
26.  In accordance with the objectives set when  the  "aoqu.is" was  last 
reviewed,  the prohibition of irrigation aDl watering everywhere i:a the 
Co..mi  Vt except in exceptional oases, has still to be foru.lised. 
Sillilarly, it has still to be  ellii1U'ed  that e:ariohM:a.t  by the addition 
of sugar, in the regions where it ia still authorized, will be 
perf'ol'llOCi  using grape  llllBto 
Spain has very strict regulations in respect ot both planting aDl 
irrigation.  Sugaring is also prohibited. 
27.  The  •jor etforts Jllllde  up  to now  in oontrolling production a:nd. 
the wine urket will not be  eJlOU&h  unless progress is lllld.e  on the 
oonswaption aide.  In so• ..,aber States, for example,  the level of 
consumer excise duties is 11110h  as to seem  sometime&  to favour  competing 
beverages. 
It is neither reasonable nor t&ir to require the southern regio1111  of 
the Comaanity to curb their amtput of produota such aa wim.  unless, 
simultaneously,  provision is made  for Community  action to encourage  the  sale 
of such products both on the Community  and the  export  market. 
II.  li'ISII!!i!!II:S 
28.  An ifti  tial difficulty resides in the faot  that the "aoguis 
COIIIIIJnaut&ire",  whose  a4option is the baSis a:nd.  objective of the 
aooession negotiatione, is ut ;yet tally d.etinecl  a:nd.  could be 
IIIOdified  substantially in the short tera, particularly as reprds 
the exploitation ot Co..unity resources. -10-
29.  Spuieh &eoeas  to Co~ty  res0111'0ea,  particularly in the BaiY  of 
Bi.acq, is wi tRout doubt  tile ••t difficult preble• to be cleal  t  vi  th 
in MptiatioDB in this sector.  Spain is requesting eqaali  ty of 
access llllll  e%ploi  taUon in CollalDi ty fisll.ing groama Gld.  oonsiclera 
-that ita fiBll.iDg ripta ehoulcl  be  ltased on the ai  tuation at 
31  llecellber 1976, before the exoluain fishing sou vas ertended to 
200 lliles. 
In the Coaaiaaion•a Yiev the extension to 200  adlea  &Dd  the difficulties 
of access to which it gave rhe &lao  fer the eo..m.  t;r fleet han set up 
a  uv balliDOe  in Co..ud  ty waters which. it  would  be  poli  ticall.;y 
clifficul  t  to overturn. 
30.  In Mcli tion to the proble11 of access, various features of the 
fieheriea sector in Spain indicate that integration will be difficult. 
ll'oa.r points in particular are  iiiPOrtu.t. 
(a}  Spain ia a  major producer &Dd  COJl~Rgerr  in the Co..uaity of 'l'welve 
about ou quarter of fiaher.n will be Spanish llllll  Sp&Di.ah  catches 
will &eo0\1Dt  for 01111  third of the total in-tel'IIB  of val'ae  &Dd 
ODB  quarter in tel'llll of quanti  t;r.  !he Sp&Di.sh  fishing fleet has a 
toJIDAP  equal to 7al>  of that of the CoDIUii ty of :JiDB' s  fishing 
fleet.  Despite the size of the fleet llllll  the extent of  catches, 
however, Spain has an overall deficit ef fieheey products. 
(b) ll'ishing is l&t'gely concentrated. in regioDB vi  th political, ecoDellio 
or social problema, i.e. the north-west coast of Spain. 
(c) 'l'b.ere  is aa i•balance between the abe of the fleet  ( 17  000 vessels 
llllll  110 000 fiaher.n) llllll  the fiahi:ag zones open to it, resul  tiDg 
.ainl;r fro• the extenaion of the exclusive fishi:ag  ~enea to 200  adles. 
Beoaaae of the unfavourable  stock situation in Co..anity waters, 
this illbala.nce is OOIIIP&rable  te that atfeoting the Co~  ty, 
althnp it is •re IIIU'ked;  Spain's entry to the Co..ani  ty will 
therefore greatly aggravate this problea and  make  it neoessar,r to 
introduce costly major reatruotari:ag ..  aaures. 
..  .~ ~·•  I  ~ -II-
(d)  Spain hae  coD.Cluded.  JmMrous fishing agreeMnts, subject to p~nt, 
with non-CoJIIIDni ty countries in order to .U:e up tor the shortfall 
in natural resources  IIZid  these have to be  taken over b7  the 
Coaani  ty;  this operation could be ditfioal  t  because ot the nuaber 
azd nature of the fishing agreeMnta concl'Wled.  with no:n-Co..ud  ty 
countries, which provide substamial eJIIPloy.ent for part of the 
Sp&lliah tleet. 
31.  '!'he  eDlargelll8nt  of the  Oo1111112i ty to i:nolude Port\\gal, on the other 
hand, will uot greatly affect the sector.  It  will be :oeoess&1'7, 
however,  to pay attention to the structural probleu lialted. with 
adjuatiag catch capacity to available resources.  !he processing 
iDdustries will also have to be diversified Uld  IIOderrlized.. 
III. IliDJS'l'!Y 
32.  When  considering the conaequeD.Ces  of enlarge•nt in this sector, 
it is worth taking a  look at the backcrnDl first.  The  1970  trade 
agreeMnt between the  CoJIIIIIIUli ty IIZid  Spain gave  Spain the be:oetit of 
considerable tariff concessions in the iaduatrial field on the basis 
ot an already low  tariff'.  Similarly, under the  1972  trade agreeMnt 
between the Co.-ni  ty azd Portugal,  ECSO  product&  aDd  nearly all lilEC 
products originating in Portugal have been iiiJ)orted. into the Co..mi  ty 
duty-tree since  1  July 1976.  ltlreover,  &rrarJ&e1118nts  have been siped 
with both Spain aDi Portugal tor trade in terliles Uld  with Spain tor 
iron and steel products. 
33•  Overall, therefore, the ll&in  iiiiPact of accession has already been 
felt on the  Co11111UJ1i ty side.  '!'his is not so, however,  on the aide of 
the applicant countries.  Spain, in particular, will have  to dislllllllUe 
highly protectionist oustou &rid  tax systems  aDil  adapt its aid system 
to CoJIIIDni ty standards.  Spain's undertaltiq to introduce VA'f  when it 
beoolll8s  a  Maber of the Co..W  ty is a  big initial step forward. 
Portugal will have to abolish its ousto .. duties for a  fUrther set of 
products as well as its no~ariff trade barriers. ····~----
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34.  Spain's  industrial  productivity  (GOP  per  person  in  employment)  is  1 
currently about  40%  less  than  that  of the  Community.  The  difference is eve 
greater  in  the  case of  Portugal.  At  the  same  time,  however,  wages  per  head 
are  much  lower  than  in the  Community  despite their recent  growth. 
It is nonetheless difficult to draw  final  conclusions  about  the competitiv,ness 
of  the  applicant  countries  on  the  basis of this general  information.  The  , 
situation can  vary considerably  from  one  branch  of  industry to another  dep~ding 
on  the  specialization of  the  applicant  country.  Moreover,  it should  be  bornf 
in mind  that  exchange  policy and  variations  in inflation control  can  have  • 
considerable  influence on  competitiveness. 
The  decline in  productive  investment  over  the  last  few  years  poses  a  major 
problem  and  appears  to be  much  more  marked  than  in most  of  the  Community 
Member  States. 
The  improvement  of  productivity is  indispensable to the  economic  development 
of  the  applicant  countries  and,  by  the fillip it will  give  to the market,  w~ll 
be  favourable  to the  exports of  the  present  Member  States,  but  it will  have! 
to be  accompanied  by  a  major  effort to restructure and diversify.  Such  an  e  fort 
will  require an  injection of  capital  and  funds  provided by  saving,  which  th 
applicant  countries  will  not  be  able to  draw  on  without  a  corresponding  red ction 
in  the  purchasing  power  of  households.  Future  developments  in  investment  an 
foreign  financing  will  be  very  important  in this  respect. -13-
35.  The  most  sensitive  industrial  problem  is  without  any  doubt  that  of 
controLLing the  development  of  sectors  suffering from  structural  overcapacity, 
both  in  the  present  Community  and  in the  rest of the  world.  These  are  primarily 
sectors  where  the  potential  demand  is not  strong  enough  for  the  supply or 
where  the  competitive  situation in  relation to newly  industrialized countries 
is  unfavourable,  so  that  production  capacities  need  to  be  adjusted,  a  necessity 
which  is accentuated  by  the  Community's  strict external  obligations with  regard 
to free  trade.  The  Community  of  Ten  has  introduced policies,  both  internal  and 
external, to  cope  with  these difficulties. 
36.  The  Commission's  more  specific  comments  on  iron  and  steel and  textiles 
are  given  below.  In  the  medium  term it is  in  the  interests of  both  the  Community 
and  the  applicant  countries  to adjust  production where  there  is structural 
overcapacity and  where  competition  from  third countries  is on  the  increase. 
(a)  Iron  and  steel 
37.  Steel  production  in  Portugal  reached  659  000  tonnes  in  1980,  0.5%  of  the 
steel  produced  by  the  Community  of  Ten  in the  same  year.  There  has  been  a  marked 
increase  in  production  in  recent  years:  with  100  as  the  basis  in  1973-74,  production 
reached 155.8 in  1980.  However,  Portugal's  external  trade  balance  in  steel  is 
well  into the  red  and  is  likely to  remain  so  in the  future,  even  when  the  new 
installations  provided  for  in the  steel development  plan start operating in 1986. 
38.  Spanish  steel  production  reached 12.6 million  tonnes  in  1980,  9.8%  of  the 
steel  produced  by  the  Community  of  Ten  in  the  same  year,  as  opposed  to  an  average 
of  about  8.5%  over  the  preceding six years.  With  100  as  the  basis  in 1973-74,  the 
Level  of  production  was  112.5  in  1980  as  against  84  for  the  Community  of  Ten. 
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From  1974  to the end  of  1980  Spanish  production capacity increased from 
13.5  million  tonnes  to 16.5  million tonnes.  The  rate of  utilization of  capa  ity 
was  75X  in 1980-81. 
39.  The  Spanish  iron  and  steel  industry,  like the  Community's,  has  been  hi~ 
by  the consequences  of the  recession.  There  has  been  a  marked  decline in  thF 
domestic  market  from  11.7 million  tonnes  in  1974  to 8.7 million tonnes  in  1~80 
(- 26X>.  Over  this period industrialists  in the sector turned to exports,  which 
increased from  one  million tonnes  in 1974  to nearly 6  million  tonnes  in 1980. 
In  1980  exports  accounted  for  about  45X  of  steel  production  as  against  9X  i~ 
1974.  This  trend can  be  seen  very clearly in the specialization index1  of  S~anish 
exports.  This  index  was  well  below  one  in the sixties  (0.29 in  1968>, _which! is 
a  poor  performance,  but  reached  1.01  in 1973  and  1.73  in  1980.  This  figure  1s 
much  higher  than  in the  Community  (1.01  on  average)  with  the  exception of  B'lgium. 
Steel  has  therefore  become  a  major  export  speciality for  Spain,  along  with  ' 
footwear  and  agricultural exports.  Exports  of  ECSC  products to the Communitt  are 
! 
currently limited to 780  000  tonnes  for  1982,  in  accordance  with  the steel 
arrangement  concluded  in  1978,  which  has  been  extended since then.  A comparlson 
of  this figure  and  Spain's  exports  to the  rest  of  the  world  underlines  the  otential 
which  accession  will  give  Spain  to  extend its trade to  the  Community. 
40.  These  export  figures  and  the  relative growth  of  production  run  counter  to 
the pattern of  Community  production,  which,  apart  from  the  years  1978  and  1  79, 
has  continued to decline.  Nevertheless,  they mask  a  general  weakness  in thi 
sector,  which  the  Spanish  authorities  have  undertaken  to  modernize  with  a  view 
to making  it more  competitive. 
In  1979  the  Spanish  Government  prepared  an  industrial  plan  of  action for  st el 
whereby  competitiveness and  production  were  to be  increased by  1985.  This  p  an 
has  never  been  finally adopted. 
1cspanish  exports/OECD  exports>  I  (total  Spanish  exports/total  OECD  exports>. -15-
41.  In 1981, however, UDier its overall illd,ustrial reatructaring pl1111 
of 5  June  1981, the Spazlieh GovernMnt  ad.opted.  aeuures to bring about 
.,O.ernisatiOD am  iiiiJirOvecl  produotivi  V  in the intecrated steel 
iDdustr;y.  ll'il'IIIDOial  IU'IIIl  other aid is to be provided..  It will be 
gr1111ted.  in exchange for etriot oolllli t•nts as to veluae of production, 
closure of non-profitable plants and coordination of production pl&DBo 
'l'he  arranp•nt• do  not eeea to be ver;y different from those in the 
Colllllnit7o 
42.  On  the other h&rld,  no particular plan has been adopted. for the 
non-integrated steel industr;y. 
In the ordinar;y steels sector the provieions of 5  June  1981  on general 
iDdustrial reetructuring appJ.7.  Tax relief &rid  finanoial benefi  te 
are granted in exchanp for a  conversion plan. 
In the special steels sector a  start has been aade on restructuring 
U!lder  tlle auspices of a  public lilli  ted.  ooapa.JV'  (sooiedad 11110nt.a)  set 
up b7 the  Spanish public authorities, vhicll is to receive large 
subsidies.  Jroreover, in the context of the nsptiatiou on the 
"Exteru.l. Relations" chapter, Spain has requeeted that the 
quantitative restrictions on epeoial steels be maintained after 
aceeesion for a  longer period 'th1111  that allowed for general tariff 
di  BJIIIUltlingo 
43•  With a  view to accession the Commission has applied itself 
particularly to evaluating the oonsequ.ences  of the aeaauree adopted b7 
the  Spanish authorities.  It notes that there is nothing in those 
currentl7 being iapleaented to iDdicate that Spain hae decided to 
reduce its overall production capaci  't7,  al  th.oup the Spanish authorities 
did give verbal assurances that overall oapaoi  ties would  not be 
increased. 
44•  '!'he  Spanish authorities' desire to restructure the Spllllish iron 
and steel eeotor and  aake UDder-takings  co~titive again tallies with 
the  CoiiiiUDit;y's•  It would,  however,  be inconsistent ~th its tuture 
status of Member  State if Spain were to eabark on a  polic7 which. 
clashed with CoiiiiUDit;y  policy. - 16-
'!'he  Co..mi  t;r hu already 1118de  its ,poai  Uon quite clear to the  SpiU'li.ah 
authorities at the negotiations, pointing out that provisions llipt be 
included in the accession inetru.~nta to lllllke  OOIIJ)8DSaUDg  ad.jut•nts 
as regards steel production levels and supplies  ~rom the  Spaaiah steel 
iDdustr;r. 
(b)  Te:riiles 
45•  With  a  view  to ensuri12g the orderl;r restructuring of ita textiles 
sector  1  the Couuni  ty took an acU  ve part in setting up  the Jill  Uti  bre 
Arrange•nt.  In the oaae of  pre~erenUal third countries it 
negotiated voluntary restraint agree  ..  nts bilaterally.  Relatione with 
Spain &lid  Portugal  ~it into the latter fra.ework.  Furtheraore, within 
the Co..unit;r the Coaadssion has introduced strict rules for the grant 
of State aida to this sector. 
46.  A look at specialization in external trade shows  the extre• 
importance  o~ textiles and  clothin~ in Portuaa11s  exports as the index 
tor these sectors is 3.84 ad 6.80 respeoU  vel;r for 1980  as against 
3.66  and  6.09 in 1973•  Bence, Portucuese textiles aDd  clothing 
exports accounted for about  3fY1,  ef armf'aotures exported in 1979.  In 
the s- ;rear the Coa.mi  t;r absorbed 65%  o~ these exports  1  al•st halt 
going to the United  KiJa&dom  and  the rest di  vid.ed  IIBinl;r between Prance 
and  Ger~.  Up  until DOW  the streftlth of the Portuguese textiles 
industry has lain prill&l'il;r in the low cost of labour rather than in a 
search for qualit;r and  innovation. 
47.  So .. IBmber  States have  expressed the fear that certain branches 
of their own  textile iDdustr;r will be  jeopardized if the principle or 
freedom of •ve•nt for industrial products is applied to Portuguese 
textiles i ...  diatel;r upon aooession. 
As  a  re81llt  o~ the negotiations at the  September  1962  negotiating 
session and  those at lliniaterial level, a  a;rstea was  set up to the 
satisfaction of both parties whereb,r this aeotor is to be integrated 
into the Co..anit;r pro~esaivel;ro -17-
48.  The  CoEssion has pointed out on several eoouioDB that it 
couidered. that the integratien of the Spuieh textile iDd.uatr;r would 
not pose the Co..anit7 a  .ajor problea. 
49.  The  aaount of textiles iaported froa Spain reached 392  ld.llien ECO 
in 1981  (1~ of total Spweh exports),  about  JCY1,  of which were "D'A" 
product•, accounting for 4.2% of Coa.mi  t7 illports of this catesory of 
products.  '!'he  ll&in  iaporiing oountries in the CoiiiiUii t7 are ll'rance 
(32%)  am  Benelux  (2J%).  Gera&D,Y1  the United lill&lloa am  Ital.7 iaport 
16%,  14%  &Dd  11%  respectiveq.  OoiiiPared with iaports froa Poriupl 
the7 eeea to be aore evenl7 diatribu.ted. 
50•  All  part of the induatrial restructuring plan the Spanish Oovernaent 
hae llllde  a  etart on the textiles seotor, which accounts for 9%  of GW 
&Dd  12%  of eaplo;yaent in the industrial seotor, althouch the  level of 
tschnoloey is low.  It aill8 to iaprove productivity am  qual.U71 
sti1111l&te  invest•nt &Dd  reaearoh1  &Dd  reduce the nwaber  of jobs.  Tu: 
relief and  aubsidie• are provided for this. 
51.  In the fra.work of the negotiations a  tendenc7 has arisen in the 
Council to request the setting up via-l-vis Spain of a  syatea sillilar 
to that established for Portugal.  For its part, Spain has asked to 
maintain after accession a  large uuaber  of quutitative restrictions 
for cotton products. 
IV.  llJDGE'l'@  XA'!TERS 
52.  It is not possible at the present stap of the accession 
negotiations with Spain am  Portugal to estiaate the budget&rT effects 
of their accession during the transitional period following accession 
because it is not known what  tr&nBi tional IIBuures will be adopted with 
regard to the acguis oo=n•utaire in the agricultural chapter. 
-}D--18-
53.  The  Commission  therefore examined the hypothesis of Spanish and 
Portuguese accession without  taking into  account  the effect.of the 
transitional measures which will be adopted in the context of the 
negotiations.  It holds the view,  which the applicant  countries have 
accepted,  that When  the applicant countries accede to the Community 
they should pa;y  all the  own  resourcea which  they owe  pursuant to the 
Council Decision of 21  April  1970. 
Account  was  not  taken of the budgetary consequences of the specific 
measures taken in favour of the United  Kingdom. 
With  the exception of olive oil, for which the price ratio is taken to 
be  2  to  1 in relation to other vegetable oils, the stimulating effects 
on  the agricultural production of the applicant  countries as a  result of 
the adoption of the acquis ooiiiJIIUll8,utaire  were  not  included.  Estimates 
relating to the EAGOF  Guidance  Section,  which are  calculated objectively 
on  the basis of the Fund's criteria, were  inoreaaed across the board by 
50%  to take account  of the  special structural weaknesses of the two 
applicant  countries.  Estimates for the other Funds were  established on 
the basis of the most  comparable  situations in the Community. 
I 
'  I 
54.  According to a  budget  drawn up  for Twelve  for the year 1981,  accessiot 
by  Spain and Portugal would have  involved an increase  in budgetary 
expenditure of between 2  8oO  million ECU  and 3  8oO  million ECU  - depending 
on the hypotheses selected- an increase in the budget  of between  15% and 
20%. 
The  margin of uncertainty can be attributed mainly to the difficulty of 
estimating these countries'  capacity to absorb funds  for structural purpos  s 
and  certain gaps in the basic data required for evaluating EAGGF  guarantee 
operations. 
Application of Community  policies in respect of the two  applicant  countrie 
suggests a  surplus in favour of Spain and Portugal of between 850  and 
1 400  million ECU. 
The  financing of this surplus would have  involved an  increase  in the  VAT 
rate of between 0.09 and 0.14 points. 
When  evaluating these results it is necessary to bear in mind  that the rat 
of utilization of the  VAT  point  in 1982  will be around 0.9%. 
.  ................ -- 19-
55•  The  structure of expenditure,  and hence  the cause  of the  surplus 
is quite different  in Spain and  Portugal.  While  in Spain expenditure 
under the EAGGF  Guarantee  Section will account for about  50%  of total 
expenditure  in its favour,  the figure  for Portugal is only 20%.of total 
expenditure because  of the weakness  of Portugal's agriculture.  This 
specific feature of Portugal can also be  seen on  the  side of resources. 
Given  the  level of its agricultural imports,  levies will account for 
almost  5o%  of the  resources paid by Portugal  into the Community  budget, 
as opposed to less than 25%  for Spain and about  10%  in the present 
Community. 
As  regards the transitional period, therefore, when  all the  information 
required for making a  clear assessment of the problem is available, the 
Community  will have  to ensure that Spain,  and  more  particularly Portugal, 
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